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A commentary on
The attentional requirements of con-
sciousness
by Cohen, M. A., Cavanagh, P., Chun, M.
M., and Nakayama, K. (2012a). Trends
Cogn. Sci. 16, 411–417. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.
2012.06.013
Response to Tsuchiya et al.: considering
endogenous and exogenous attention.
by Cohen, M. A., Cavanagh, P., Chun, M.
M., and Nakayama, K. (2012b). Trends
Cogn. Sci. 16, 528. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2012.
09.002
Top-down attention and consciousness:
comment on Cohen et al.
by Tsuchiya, N., Block, N., and Koch, C.
(2012). Trends Cogn. Sci. 16, 527. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2012.09.004
In a recent debate, the views that top-down
attention is necessary for consciousness
(Cohen et al., 2012a,b) and that conscious-
ness is independent of top-down attention
(Tsuchiya et al., 2012) have clashed. Here,
we list the overlooked or ignored argu-
ments that should be considered before
deciding that consciousness is inevitably
the result of attention.
The issue of relation of bottom-up
attention and consciousness seems to have
two possible solutions according to the
evidence available at present. First, based
on the current evidence it may be agreed
upon that conscious experience cannot
be dissociated from bottom-up exogenous
attention (Tsuchiya et al., 2012). Second, it
is possible that there is phenomenal con-
sciousness emerging without bottom-up
attention, but empirical evidence for this is
either lacking or too much controversial at
present. Here, we consider some instances
where simple conscious experience, i.e.,
phenomenal awareness emerges without
top-down attentional deployment:
1. Sensory experiences can be brought
about artificially by brain stimula-
tion such as when using transcranial
magnetic stimulation (TMS). Visual
scotomas (Murd et al., 2010) or
phosphenes as “visual echoes” (Jolij
and Lamme, 2010) generated by early
visual cortex stimulation serve as an
example for simple conscious expe-
riences evoked by TMS. Attention is
not needed for these conscious experi-
ences. Such artificial experience can be
evoked at an unexpected moment and
location and will become available for
attention only subsequently. It could be
argued that in the task where subjects
evaluate their phosphenes or scotomas
the subjects are still attending to these
conscious phenomena. However, we
claim that if a subject is performing an
attending task unrelated to TMS and
visual perception, but is unexpectedly
given a single TMS pulse which elicits
a phosphene, this phosphene will be
consciously perceived.
2. Similarly, involuntary hallucinations
and pathological sensations emerge
without any attention to these con-
tents. For example consider tinnitus or
auditory verbal hallucinations. It would
be a simple remedy for the patients
if simply not attending to the hallu-
cinations would make them disappear.
Many such hallucinations come and go
without the subject having any control
of their duration or onset (Sacks, 2012).
3. No attention is required for dream
episodes. Dreams are conscious expe-
riences which are generally character-
ized by the lack of top-down attention
(Hobson, 2002). The loss of top-down
control and attention in typical every-
day dreams is also evidenced by the
peculiar feeling that accompanies lucid
dreaming, where due to training some
top-down control over the dream con-
tent becomes available for the subject
(e.g., Voss et al., 2009).
4. Experiments and phenomenology on
microgenetic formation of percep-
tual images and visual immediate
(iconic) memory demonstrate that
phenomenal-perceptual proto-objects
or scenes can precede attentional
selection (Bachmann, 2000; Lamme,
2004, 2010) and that non-attended
objects are consciously experienced
(Vandenbroucke et al., 2012).
These arguments show that sim-
ple conscious experience could emerge
independently of attention. One could
argue that in all these cases even when the
conscious experience is very simple (as in
the case of phosphenes) the stimulus is
first represented in the brain, then ampli-
fied by top-down attention and only then
emerges in awareness. Thus, one could
claim that these arguments are not suffi-
cient for showing that simple conscious
experience can emerge without attention.
However, even if one would agree that the
evidence does not convincingly demon-
strate the independence of attention and
consciousness, it would not imply that
attention is necessary for consciousness.
Furthermore, there are some additional
arguments to support the independence of
attention and consciousness.
5. If attention is necessary for conscious
perception, attending to certain phe-
nomenal content should not be unfa-
vorable for experiencing this content.
However, several recent studies have
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shown that attention has a detrimen-
tal effect on the duration of afterim-
ages or sensory aftereffects (Lou, 2001;
Bachmann and Murd, 2010; van Boxtel
et al., 2010). If attention readily elimi-
nates phenomenal experience then the
awareness-related mechanisms whose
activity is suppressed together with
phenomenal experience must be inde-
pendent from the attentional mecha-
nisms.
6. Attending to the contents of the cur-
rently dominating image in binocular
rivalry does not preclude that the com-
peting alternative might spontaneously
emerge in phenomenal awareness. If
attention is necessary for consciousness
and it is deployed to the dominating
image, how could the suppressed image
access awareness?
7. Many authors agree that consciousness
and attention have different neurobi-
ological mechanisms (Lamme, 2004;
Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007; Bachmann,
2011). This of course does not deny
interaction between these mechanisms
in typical cases where attention has
a supportive role in bringing percep-
tual contents to consciousness, but
the independence of the neurobiolog-
ical mechanisms supports the view
that attention and consciousness are
autonomous processes.
Finally, it is not true that in order to
support the independence of conscious-
ness and attention one has to show that
attention is not needed for the stimu-
lus to enter consciousness across a set
of experimental paradigms (Cohen et al.,
2012a). In fact, one could turn the argu-
ment around: if it is consistently shown
by many research groups that attention is
not needed for conscious perception even
in one single paradigm, then this already
implies that attention is not necessary for
consciousness. It was also argued that the
absence of the attentional effect on con-
sciousness is a null finding which should
be treated with caution (Cohen et al.,
2012a). However, if this null finding is con-
sistent over several experiments with suffi-
cient statistical power, this result is solid by
any scientific standard.
Taken together, these arguments sup-
port the view that attention and conscious-
ness are independent from each other, but
can interact. Phenomenal consciousness
can emerge without attention.
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